Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit: Den Tod verstehen (German Edition)

Free download. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read online Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit: Den Tod verstehen (German Edition) file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit: Den Tod verstehen (German Edition) book. Happy reading Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit: Den Tod verstehen (German Edition) Bookeveryone. Download file Free Book PDF Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit: Den Tod verstehen (German Edition) at Complete PDF Library. This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats. Here is The CompletePDF Book Library. It's free to register here to get Book file PDF Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit: Den Tod verstehen (German Edition) Pocket Guide.

Also it becomes clear in which way the preservation of Being in the artwork has to do with the mystical Dasein and also how the phenomenological concepts of order, historicity, resignation and preservation are contained together in the wholeness of the mystical basic attitude. The mystical Dasein exists historically and is always contained in the language of his time, place and culture, wherefrom the world for him is in order.

However the mystical Dasein is in contrary to the everyday Dasein not fully lost in that orderly world. The ordered beings of that world are in order, but are by the mystical Dasein so to speak encountered from the attitude of resignation. The mystical Dasein is not lost in, but resigned towards the him surrounding beings. Now to the language of his culture also belong the linguistic works which are available to him.

To those linguistic works subsequently also belong poetic, religious and mystical works. For as far as these works are able to say the inexpressible they have to be preserved as such by the Dasein. This shall not happen with the everyday Dasein. And this then all in the resignation of letting the work be a work. In the mystical basic attitude the mystical Dasein preserves orderly, historicitic and resigned the inexpressible secret. The mystical basic attitude was characterized by order, and the mystical experience was characterized by chaos.

A meaning which was also acknowledged by Heidegger. This nullifying, so we saw, lies at the base of the Being of the beings. That something is, means equal originally that it is not nothing. At the same time it is as that ground however never itself a being. With that it is however a very remarkable ground. For it is exactly the nothing which holds the meanings of the beings back and stores them away within itself. However Heidegger understands this abys of course from his thought in a phenomenological way. The nullifying of the night because of which the night is seen as noxious is not a physical destruction of the beings but regards the nullifying or not-ing of the nothing.

In the sinking away of the meanings of the world the Dasein sees himself placed in a chaos which however regards not just a disruption of the orderly living world but also the empty space in which Being makes its full entry when this Being is unclosed in an original way. And Being is the abys for those beings because the sinking away of the meanings of the beings is equal-original with the giving itself in an original way of Being in the anxiety and the Ereignis.

Through another approach this apparent paradox can be made compatible by discerning between an ontic and a phenomenological thought. The ontic thought thinks of a ground as being a being. The first ground is for that thought a highest being; the idea of the good, God or the human subject for instance. For such a thought Being must be thought as abys or un-ground because Being itself is never a being.

And this then is also the way in which the nothing nullifies or not-ings in the Being of beings, namely as grounding abys or un-ground or as un-grounding ground. In that sense the nothing and Being are thus equal-original. This relation shall in this sub-paragraph evenly so be saved, whereby here however the emphasis shall be laid on the Ereignis.

In paragraph 1. Let us here reiterate and work out further one and the other through a somewhat larger consideration on this concept. The only thing which the Dasein can do is keeping the openness for a possible Ereignis. This however takes place in the mystical ground attitude and is not a guarantee that Being will give itself in an original way.

This is analogically to the way in which the passivity of the mystic is thematised. There is no transcendent Being which gives and shows itself to a from that Being isolated human or subject. The Dasein is equal-originally with Being contained in the Ereignis and the happening of Being is equal-originally an own happening. The happening is therewith thus no pure subjective experience which could be summoned by one or the other transcendent given.

When the mystical experience is understood phenomenologically it must thus be understood in a more original way as mystical happening. This is in this consideration however not the subject of research. That this happening is intimately own to the Dasein makes that we may understand and thematize Ereignis also as enfindingness. Fear is ever fear of a particular inner-worldly being, however anxiety is anxiety for world as such. In the anxiety the Dasein is not-home, the Dasein is Unheimlich.

The whole of beings then must not be understood metaphysically as the totality of particular beings, but as the ungraspable horizon of understanding which makes the understanding of particular beings only possible. Thereby must those two meanings according to the phenomenological analysis also be thought equal-originally.

Chaos is the emptiness of the nullifying or not-ing nothing as abys or un-ground wherein the covering meanings of the world fall away, through which Being gives itself grounding as world-as-such, as physis , as the whole of beings. This chaos goes along with Ereignis and with anxiety. With that remark the previous sub-paragraph was concluded. Before that, in sub-paragraph 3. And here then shall a phenomenological analysis of anxiety be the central point of departure, to from there arrive at an important other characteristic of the mystical experience.

Already under sub-paragraph 1. Also was seen that anxiety must be differentiated from fear. Fear is always fear for an inner-worldly being, and anxiety is anxiety for world-as-such. This last aspect of anxiety was already enough elucidated in the previous sub-paragraph. But what about the running ahead of the own death which takes place in anxiety? Possibility is according to Heidegger higher than reality, and equal-originally with the designing understanding of the world the Dasein understands himself in the possibilities which he sees from himself and which he is himself.

This designing himself to the own death or the own end must be sharply distinguished from a simple dying away of the body. In place of a to-the-end-being it regards a being-to-the-end [ Sein zum Ende ], wherewith is indicated that the death which is here under consideration regards a way of being of the Dasein. The Dasein thus is in an authentic way when he is whole and to-the-end. That this awareness of being-to-the-end is exactly taking place in the anxiety is understandable when it is taken in consideration that the Dasein and world take place equal-originally.

The Dasein understands himself and his own identity, so as he designs himself, equal-originally with the designed meanings of the world. This is comparable with the falling away of the from the orderly world derived personal identity of the mystic which in the mystical experience falls away. And it is also understandable that the Dasein when the own death is in play, equal-originally with the anxiety, is set in an Unheimlichkeit. For what is more anxiety evoking and sinister than the own death?

Now in this being-to-the-end is contained a being-to-death [ Sein zum Tode ]. For being-to-death the Dasein is when he runs ahead to the own death. Possibility demands futurity; without futurity everything would be actual, or perhaps actuality which has been, but every possibility would lack.

The Dasein is with the futural designing himself to possibilities thus so to speak always ahead of himself. And what becomes him in the futurity or to-come-ness of the running ahead of the own death in the anxiety is his most-own possibility. For in the moment of the authenticity where the Dasein takes on himself his fate not only a running ahead takes place, but equal-originally a resolve on a in the fate contained most-own design. For a design is ever a for the world meaningful design. Here it is that authentic history is founded.

Heidegger understands Ereignis , and this is still equal-originally with the theme in this sub-paragraph taken along, as the essence of history. This is something which especially takes place in poetry. As in sub-paragraph 3. Being sends itself in poetry linguistically, and is in this way the authentic origin of historicality and history.

What does this abstract figure of thought mean when we make it concrete through our consideration of the mystical Dasein? In the mystical basic attitude the mystical Dasein is historical in the sense that he is always standing in a particular culture and tradition. He shall design the world, himself and equal-originally for instance his spiritual practises from the by the they delivered doctrine.

This by the way without getting lost therein, after all the mystical Dasein distinguished himself therein from the everyday Dasein. This does happen in the mystical experience. There the mystical Dasein is taken back from the by the they delivered doctrine and takes ahead-running resolved his own fate on himself. This taking on himself of the own fate is however equal-originally a moment of designing, knowingly a poetic designing.

The mystical Dasein in the mystical experience designs the world, himself and the doctrine poetically and founds therewith history. He shall speak new words and with that innovate the doctrine which historically though covering was delivered. These three concepts we see equal-originally collected in another concept which was already mentioned under sub-paragraph 3. For the artwork, so we repeat, may lose its Being unclosing nature and degenerate into a simple at hand being when it is not preserved as Being unclosing.

Then what is the way to think this fixation of Being? That Being must have given itself in an original way to the artist the Dasein in the Ereignis seems obvious. That thus means that for the art creating Dasein the meanings of the world and equal-originally the meanings of the own identity have sunk away. It is therefore that Heidegger can say that in the coming to being of great art the artist so to speak is nullified or en-not-inged for himself and with that is a medium for Being to set itself Beings self in the work.

Now the Being which gives itself to the Dasein in Ereignis should not be seen as the actual but as the possible. The beings in Ereignis in an authentic way designing, the unconcealment of Being is so to speak thrown into the beings. Being is in its most-own possibility fixated in the authentic design of the artwork.

Herewith is the shape of such a great artwork thus actually the fixation of the sending of Being [ Seinsgeschick ]. This sending of Being is also that which makes out the authentic historicality of a people. This according to Heidegger takes especially place in the poetic art because this regards a linguistic artform.

In any way the mystic finds in art a possibility for expression of the inexpressible, however this goes especially for linguistic expressions such as for instance prayer, theology or philosophy. For there he tries to say the inexpressible. For therein must the inexpressible in the spoken speak along.

In this way are in the fixation thus Ereignis , design and history contained. This fixation of the unconcealment of Being, as in a great artwork or in a mystical deliverance, must therewith however be preserved. Being can after fixation in the artwork of the deliverance not give itself in an original way when Being therein is not preserved in an original way.

This preservation already was thematized in sub-paragraph 3. Here however the mystical experience was under consideration. This was phenomenological made understandable through the characteristics of chaos, Ereignis , foundation and fixation. In the mystical experience is the in chaos Ereigneted Being history founding fixated.

Titles of works are both attuned and attuning. Attuned they are to the essence of the content of the work and attuning they are with regards to the possible reader who, when not distuned, is attuned to a questioning for the essence of the regarded work. In chapter 1 the question for the Heideggerian was asked. The goal was especially to sketch a general image of Heideggers though which characterizes the Heideggerian , wherefrom in chapter 3 then the main question could be asked.

This sketching of a general image of Heideggers thought was consequently done through a few important characteristics which can be recognized in that thought. Therewith Heidegger wanted to point out that the Being of the beings is itself not a being. With reference to the content two to each other related characteristics were brought to the fore. In the first characteristic Being is thematised as origin and essence of the beings, whereby usually the beings cover that origin.

And to that characteristic related Heidegger then thinks also a certain wholeness which is never given concretely and at hand but which as horizon is the condition of possibility for the concrete beings to appear meaningful. Hereby was departed from a unity in that thought. In chapter 2 consequently the question for mysticism was asked. Therefore a search was started to the central given of mysticism, to that around which mysticism pivots. Herein the essence of mysticism would be contained.

Consequently mysticism was further thematised in some important sub-aspects because the whole must be elucidated through its parts. As three basic elements of mysticism were the transcendent, the mystic and the doctrine found, and as the two central moments in mysticism were the mystical basic attitude and the mystical experience brought to the fore.

The mystical basic attitude was characterized by an orderly longing and strife for union with the transcendent, and the mystical experience was characterized by chaos and emptiness of the orderly world and by union with the entering fullness of the transcendent. The findings which came to the fore in the thematising of the two sub-questions for the Heideggerian and for mysticism were conclusively taken along to chapter 3. For the thematising of isolated from each other thinkable things was no place, and thinking from the wholeness sub-aspects in their mutual coherency had to be brought to the fore.

In the first paragraph then the essence of mysticism was phenomenologically made understandable through the in chapter 2 found concealment and secret as that around which mysticism pivots. In short: The nullifying or not-ing of the nothing in the night as origin of the in secret waged battle between concealment and unconcealment is around which a Heideggerian mysticism pivots, is the essence of a Heideggerian mysticism. In the second paragraph the mystical basic attitude was made phenomenologically understandable. Order was there understood from the everydayness wherein the Dasein is lost in the they.

The mystical Dasein however was not everyday-ish everyday-ish and thus a further refinement was needed. Without losing sight of the coherency were the characteristics of historicality, resignation and preservation brought to the fore. Historically the mystical Dasein is from the by Being sent and by the people delivered doctrine, resigned he is with regards to the beings which from the deliverance are ordered, and preserving he is because he preserves the secret in the delivered doctrine.

In the mystical basic attitude the mystical Dasein preserves orderly, historically and resigned the inexpressible secret. Conclusively in the third paragraph a phenomenological design took place of the mystical experience. Chaos turned out to unite within itself ground and abys or un-ground because in the sinking away of the meanings of the world in the abys or un-ground Being as ground makes its entrance, and this chaos was thereby paired with Ereignis and with anxiety.

Chaos is the void of the nullifying or not-ing nothing as abys or un-ground wherein the covering meanings of the world fall away, through which Being gives itself grounding as world-as-such, as physis , as the whole of beings. This chaos is paired with Ereignis and with anxiety. Besides Ereignis were the other two important characteristics which in their mutual coherence with Ereignis were thematised foundation and preservation.

For the mystical Dasein in the mystical experience turned out to be history founding in the fixation of Being in the mystical doctrine. In the mystical experience the in the chaos Ereigneted Being is history founding fixated. Mysticism is the openness for the secret that Being in the order of the everydayness covering holds itself back, but in the nothing of the chaos can send itself and give itself in an original way.

This final conclusion may as closed definition be accepted or rejected, or may perhaps attune to a deeper questioning for a Heideggerian mysticism. As Being sends itself, thus it will befall. Welcome Publications Donations Contact. Author: Arvindus. Publisher: Arvindus. Index: Edition: html, first edition. MYSTICISM In the introduction it was already asserted that in the question for a Heideggerian mysticism together with the question for the Heideggerian also the question for mysticism as such comes to the fore. Notes Charles B. Wir halten nur fest: Er dient zur Bezeichnung von Philosophie.

He poetizes out of an experience of the truth of Being, of the genuine dwelling place of mortals. Critical Assessments. Sein und Grund: das Selbe. Heidegger often uses the notion of a horizon to describe this thinking of being beyond the totality envisioned by the tradition.

Chapter 8: What Is Existentialism?

Rather, the whole is the element to which we belong. It is the element that precedes every appearance and in which every being is given to us as a present being. Instead of these we find the concept Dasein. In each case the aim is a reawakening of the encounter with Being, even if this is seen from the point of view of the human subject in the one case and from the point of view of the history of Being in the other.

Volume 4. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit , p. Heideggers ontwerp van een fundamentele ontologie en de kwestie van de ethiek , Damon, Best, , p. Das Wovor der Angst ist kein innerweltliches Seiendes. This gift, reaching, or advent withdraws itself in the gift of presencing Anwesen. Heidegger derives it directly from schicken as 'what is sent', often writing Ge-Schick: […]. Heidegger uses wesen as a verb, although it is seldom used as such in modern German.

Martin Heidegger, Used

Heidegger restores their association with light, so that they mean 'light en ing; to light en '. Why Being reveals itself to us in the being of entities and yet at the same time withholds itself as such in concealment is a mystery for Heidegger. Gelassenheit is not the counter-concept to anxiety; it is its further refinement.

Und sie ist nur, sofern und solange Dasein ist. Willy Bretschneider, Sein und Wahrheit. Forman editor , The problem of pure consciousness: mysticism and philosophy , Oxford University Press, New York, , p. Poulain, geciteerd naar: Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit. Vormen, grondslagen, methoden , Kok, Carmelitana, Kampen, Gent, , p. Moioli, geciteerd naar: Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit , p.

Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit , p. Tollenaere, met medewerking van A. Het afzonderlijke wordt begrepen vanuit een voorgegeven geheel. Omgekeerd geldt echter, dat het geheel op zijn beurt toegelicht moet worden vanuit de delen; vanaf dit laatste moment zit men in een cirkelverhouding. Nooit stelt deze mystieke weg zich echter buiten het leerstellige of institutionele element. It is rather a reference or a guide that offers us a first glimpse of a particular phenomenon.

Victor d. Negative theology emancipates God from anthropomorphism — that is, from the imposition of human characteristics to God; it ends in silence. Positive or affirmative theology uses names such as light or beauty but only as metaphors or symbols of God. Negative theology does not eliminate affirmative theology but purifies the concepts and symbols which human beings imperfectly apply to God.

Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische. Toch heeft het zin onderscheid aan te brengen. Ook binnen het protestantisme blijkt een beperking van de omgang met God tot de geloofsbeleving van overgave en vertrouwen geen recht te doen aan wat zich in het leven van mensen kan voordoen. Soms worden mensen overvallen door een eenheidsbeleving, een aanraking met een transcendente werkelijkheid, een wegvoering naar het paradijs waar onuitsprekelijke woorden gehoord worden, een beslissende ontmoeting die tot een volledige ommekeer en een ongekende solidariteit met andere mensen leidt, kortom een mystieke ervaring waarop een mystieke weg volgen kan.

Dit valt niet volledig samen met wat in het protestantisme onder geloofszekerheid verstaan wordt. Mystiek blijft daarom een apart fenomeen. De heilige is verteerd door het heilige. De heilige is opgenomen in de heiligheid van de Heilige.

Log in to Wiley Online Library

Ontbreken deze geschriften, dan beschikken wij eenvoudigweg niet over de gegevens die ons in staat stellen om te beoordelen of zij al dan niet mystici geweest zijn. In die spanning van moeten en niet-kunnen wordt de mystieke taal geboren.

Heidegger's New Aspect: On In-Sein, Zeitlichkeit, and The Genesis of "Being and Time"1

These diverse forms include biography, biblical exegesis, aphorisms, theoretical and theosophical treatises, poems, prayers, polemics, dogmatics, and didactic compositions. To recognize only one of these poles — it does not matter which — is to misrepresent the phenomenon. Leben und Wirken , C. In de eigen binnentuin ben je thuis; je kent de codes en de woorden. Je bent er de baas. Dat is de nacht van het verstand. James] voorbijgaand en kort van duur; hoogtepunten duren zelden langer dan enkele uren en meestal niet langer dan een half uur.

Fred Muller, J. Susan Niditch, Chaos to Cosmos. Renkema, Beknopt Latijns-Nederlands woordenboek , tiende druk, J. Evelyn-White, William Heinemann Ltd. Otger Steggink, Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit en mystiek , p. Anderzijds breekt op het dieptepunt van de afbraak plotseling en onaangekondigd een nieuwe laag in het zelf door, een laag die echter gewekt is door de onmiddellijk ervaren Ander, door de Onuitsprekelijke, door de tot dan toe ongekende Kern van de Werkelijkheid.

See: notes , Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Disclosure and Displacement , p. See: chapter 1. See: note Martin Heidegger, Parmenides , p. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Wahrheit , p. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary , p. De uiteindelijke zuivering volstrekt zich in de vierde fase: de donkere nacht van de ziel of de mystieke dood. De mystieke vereniging, […]. Das Nichts selbst nichtet. See: sub-paragraph 1. Nicht vor innerweltlichem Seienden, sondern gerade zu diesem als dem Seienden, dabei das Besorgen, verloren in das Man, in beruhigter Vertrautheit sich aufhalten kann.

Language, and especially poetic language, is therefore also the occurrence of truth. Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund , p. Von hier aus bestimmt sich das Wesen aller Geschichte. Thus the soul which has left behind all the obstacles to the birth of God can at the same time permit or let the Father bear His Son there. See: sub-paragraph 2. L[ehrer]: Doch der Aufenthalt in diesem Zwischen ist das Warten.

Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache , p. Einer kann sprechen, spricht endlos, und alles ist nichtsagend. Dagegen schweigt jemand, er spricht nicht und kann im Nichtsprechen viel sagen. Without the second way of designation, Scheler could not claim that in the modem age the rationality of society has invaded and taken over empirical families, states, etc.

This tension forces or allows Scheler to develop his project within, as it were, the historicized framework of Christian original sin and recovery. Scheler leaves out the theological veto upon the realization of recovery here on earth through human achievement. This is the first step of the alignment of his theory with the political Right.

Henderson and T. Parsons Glencoe, IL. This slight modification expresses his theoretical program; namely, to de-ontologize the concepts. In Weber they don't designate different areas or inherent ontological features of certain activities childraising, love in matrimony, economic activities, etc. This is an instance of the way politics is implied in Weberian science. This theoretical maneuver pulls the rug out from under the feet of any rightist politics, at least concerning the pretension to place rightist politics on a scientific basis. Weber points out that there is no purity.

The great majority of social relationships is informed by both forms of synthesis. The awareness of the impossibility of the pure allows, one might add, a non-ontological mode of critique according to pragmatic points of view or according to, say, the liberal notion of human rights. In addition, many sociologists regard the communal type of relationship as the most radical antithesis of conflict, which, in contrast, is considered to be inherent in the associative type of relationship.

Thus, there is no scientific basis for maintaining that every individual is a priori part of this or that Gemeinschaft, and for calling upon people to form that Volksgemeinschaft they already belong to in order to rerealize alleged biological features and the Gemeinschaft shaped by the latter. In the same way, a common language does not imply any sort of communal social relationship between the speakers.

Every social relationship which goes beyond the pursuit of immediate common ends, and which hence lasts for long periods, involves relatively permanent social relationships between the same persons, and these cannot be exclusively confined to the technically necessary activities. The fact that, on these two out of the thirty pages on the basic concepts of sociology, in a book of more than nine hundred pages, the most urgent themes and problems—race, language, military, and the economy—are presented shows that the two concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft were indeed the major framework within which political problems were discussed at the time.

One must not think that here Scheler propagates socialism or communism. See the remainder of this chapter. Only from that part of the central essence of justice according to which the occurrence of the same comportment on the condition of the same value-complexes is good and ought to be does it follow that if there is reprisal, it must aim equally at factors of equivalent value. The translation is not just more or less inexact. Rather, it conveys precisely the opposite of Scheler's theories and political intentions. Like other rightist authors, he argues against mixtures, against processes in which distinctions and rankings he considers essential are leveled or confused.

Processes of mixture are not—as the English translation suggests—a productive source and a means to realize the values. Rather, they are the processes by which the right order of values is overthrown and which terminate in socialism, chaos, and anarchy. Mankind, however, entails a hierarchy of the different peoples and races that liberalism and social democracy have done away with.

One might also say that the mistranslation of the German phrase is a projection of the later Scheler onto the earlier Scheler see section F of this chapter. By this, he probably acknowledges that he has underestimated the anticapitalist potential of the conservatives, which, for Scheler they proved through their support of the war. The note is interesting because, as will become clear in what follows, according to Scheler the bourgeois ethos is bound to die out.

However, this takes time. In the meantime, it is possible to speed up the process, among other things through World War I, sent by God as a gift. According to rightists, in Gesellschaft we encounter selfish individuals, and we are lonely.

  • Suffer & Survive: The Extreme Life of Dr J.S. Haldane!
  • Neue Keynesianische Makroökonomie: Das New Keynesian Model (German Edition);
  • The Time of History (Michael Eldred)!

We all know that killing in wars is not regarded as murder. Frings [Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, ]. In his decisionistic phase, Scheler wrote much on the Held, that is, on the right-wing notion of Vorbild, example to follow. That is, the soldier is higher than the heroes, or paradigms, of the state and the Volksgemeinschaft, and he is higher than the other heroes of a Kulturgemeinschaft; the soldier is only below the hero, or paradigm, of the love-community, Jesus Christ, since for Scheler, prior to his Kehre, the soldier fights for Jesus Christ and the love-community.

The flag is an Erwiderung and Widerruf in Heidegger's sense. It erwidert the past, or what-has-been-there, insofar as it brings back the Aryan race, which has been spoiled and forgotten. This step requires that one widerruft the Weimar Republic and its flag, whose colors were black, red, and gold. For the details see above, pp. He always stresses that a community is ontologically prior to its individual members, whereas society is ontologically posterior to its individual members.

As one might expect, neither Birmingham nor Guignon quote this sentence. Todtnauberg, August On openness and Entschlossenheit see above, chapter 1, section A. In the light of Heidegger's notorious statement on the German and the Greek language IM 57; EM 43 it is interesting that, with regard to the words used by Heidegger, the Latin and the English languages have a clear advantage over Greek and German. A repetitio is a re-clamation, the demand of something or someone back.

In order to do so, we act onto the inauthentic Dasein the way the past has acted upon us, that is, we carry the call over to the inauthentic Daseine. Inauthentic Dasein does not listen to, and does not respond to, the call, whereas authentic Dasein does so. In Birmingham's interpretation, the x is authentic Dasein's polemos against the past, this polemos being even more radical than a military counterattack with equal weapons TP One might speculate what it would say about Heidegger, and in general about problems of intellectual and political mentality, if indeed it were coincidental.

If he had joined the party just one year earlier, his Tat, deed, would have been a good instance of the kind of activity called for by the sentences on Erwiderung and Widerruf. For I May was the holiday in honor of the working class. Thus, to make one's stand for the Volksgemeinschaft on any I May prior to or, for that matter, on any other day of the year meant that one helped the Volksgemeinschaft in its call for help and repetition by actively disavowing, fighting against, expelling, the holiday in honor of the working class. On I May , however, the working class and its special day was already forbidden, and its leaders were already arrested.

Thus, to join the Nazis on I May was an act of, as one puts it in German, sich ins schon gemachte Bett zu legen; an act of lying down in a bed prepared by someone else, in Heidegger's case also by his major work Being and Time. The Dasein owes its Geschicklichkeiten, its capacities, not to itself but rather to the Volk and, at least for Heidegger in , this includes its soil, as Schlageter is capable of the hardness of the will because the Black Forest has worked on the Daseine living in it for a long time, see chapter 1, n. The Volk as Geschick gives to the individuals their capacities.

There is no real purpose in its life, and it does not respect its past. In brief, Dasein is geworfen, thrown into a naked facticity of inauthentic possibilities as it realizes upon becoming authentic. Once authentic Dasein has taken over its thrownness, it realizes that, now, it is no longer geworfen, thrown, but geschickt, sent. For Geschick has sent it to realize the Geschick, the mission, namely, to rerealize Gemeinschaft. In addition, Geschick has provided Dasein with the necessary Geschicklichkeiten, has made Dasein geschickt to fulfill its mission. However, in the discourse of the rightists it also has, as in Heidegger's sentence in section 64, an aggressive component directed against Enlightenment and the supposed vacillations of the city-dwellers.

It entails the obligation to share fully, both passively and actively, in the toil, the striving, and the abilities of all estates and members of the Volk. Why do Daseine run forward into death? Section 60 is the last section in the chapter on conscience and its call. Daseine run forward into death because they are called upon to do so by the call of conscience. Does the call of conscience call upon all Daseine or only on some?

Permanent Revolution: Heidegger Part III German

At any rate, not each Dasein hearing the call listens and obeys to it. Why do some Daseine listen to the call while others don't? Heidegger gives an answer in the chapter on conscience. In the context of that chapter as well as of the chapter on historicality, the metaphor in which he coins his answer can be taken literally. In the chapter on conscience, he argues against the universalism of Enlightenment. The authentic Daseine want to be brought back to the battlefields of World War I, because already their heroes wanted to be brought back to and rerealize the communities that had existed prior to Enlightenment and society and were toppled by Enlightenment and society.

Still, the decision to cancel society does not prevent the authentic Daseine from taking over modern technology and capitalism as an economic system. As was mentioned above, Scheler and Heidegger do not need to elaborate on the notion of fate, for they just make use of the meaning of the everyday usage of Schicksal in their explanation of history. Only those who wanted to redefine the notion of fate had to comment on it as, for instance, Benjamin in his essay "Fate and Character" Walter Benjamin, Reflections , trans. Edmund Jephcott [New York: Schocken, ], Lachtermann [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, ], Goebbels on the front page of the weekly Das Reich , "Die Juden sind schuld!

Thus, Goebbels makes fun of Jews who try to evoke compassion or who try to hide their Judenstern by carrying a newspaper. The police eilt ihnen nach, runs after them, and, if successful, er-eilt sie, that is, holt sie ein, overtakes them, catches up with them, and re-arrests them. Only some of the Jews had left Germany early enough to evade their fate.

However, several of them were eingeholt by their fate at a later point. Tiedemann [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, ]. In Marseille he managed to get a transit visa to Spain. However, on 26 September , when the group of people with whom he had made the escape wanted to cross the border in the small Spanish border town Port Bou, they were told that the day before the border had been closed and that their visas were no longer accepted. The Spanish customs officers told them that the next day Spanish police officers would take them back to France, which meant that they would be deported to German concentration camps.

Benjamin killed himself that night. In the aftermath of his suicide, the Spanish customs officers let the rest of the group pass into Spain. In summer on Ibiza, Benjamin had fallen in love with a woman from the Netherlands. By no horror and by no luck could it any longer surprise me. Thus, by the same token as he begegnet to me I begegne to him. Benjamin's sentence was written in the awareness that, sooner or later, his fate will indeed einholen him. All that is left to him is the hope that the arms of the woman will give him the virtue of ataraxia such that even in the moment when fate holt ihn ein and crushes him, at the same time it does not einholen ihn.

Then it would be good if not everybody noticed at once that I was a Jew. That is why besides the name I was called they added two further, exceptional ones, from which one could see neither that a Jew bore them nor that they belonged to him as first names.

Content Metrics

Forty years ago no parental couple could prove itself more far-seeing. What it held to be only a remote possibility has come true. Smith [ed. As mentioned above, a Begegnung itself is symmetrical. If two people sich begegnen, it is not yet determined what happens next. In the way Hitler and Benjamin use the term, the encounter between me and my fate is hostile, insofar as my fate wants to crush me and, thus, being the coward I am, I try to evade it or counteract it.

As mentioned above, however, there are, so to speak, friendly Begegnungen as well see chapter 1, nn. Section 74 of Being and Time suggests, as it were, a friendly Begegnung between Gemeinschaft and authentic Dasein that includes a hostile Begegnung between authentic Dasein and Gesellschaft, insofar as authentic Dasein has to expel, to destroy, Gesellschaft. In the thirties, Heidegger labeled the same imperative of authentic politics logos see chapter 5, section B.

The Germans begegneten their fate and each other, that is, gathered themselves. Tarnowski and F. Emmanuel Martineau [Paris: Authentica, ], By adding the hyphen, Martineau obviously wants to suggest that this rencontre is a hostile encounter in which Dasein acts contre against fate and, thus, neither performs a repetition of the past nor complies with the call of the past but breaks with the past and the past's call for repetition. Thus, probably in the French literature on Heidegger one finds interpretations of the sentence similar to those of Guignon and Birmingham, especially since deconstructionism is strong in France.

The Mitgifi makes the bride—so speaks the English language! As I have tried to show, the rightist concept of de-cision is not a decision. Close to the beginning of his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel says that the tradition, the history of philosophy, has preserved what the past has produced. Knox and A. He already used the metaphor of a Strom, river, on the first page.

At the end of the river of world history, Hegel makes philosophy turn within and back to the past. However, philosophy is not supposed to turn back to the past in order to cancel the present and to rerealize the past. I have pointed out the logic in Hitler and in Scheler prior to the latter's Kehre. There is something great—the Aryans—and there is something small—the Jews.

History is decline, because what-is-small drags down what-is-great and is unable to elevate itself. I have also shown the same general motif of history as decline, downward plunge, and rerealization in Heidegger whose metaphor of origin and that which entspringt the origin, jumps out of it, sets the tone for his concept of historicality see above, chapter 2, section A; also chapter 2, n.

Its beginning is in fact the greatest thing of all. It is interesting to note how, after his Kehre, Scheler returns to Hegel's metaphors. See Hitler's metaphor above, p. A Menschenfresser is someone who eats human beings, that is, a cannibal. Thus, a Sozialistenfresser, in a political analogy to a Menschenfresser has an appetite for those on the Left. In light of the passages on utopian ideals I quoted at length in section B of chapter 1, I take him to say: Christians, Marxists, liberals, and conservatives all live in the same tradition and present.

Each group has specific utopian ideals. Due to the particular utopian ideal of each group, they each interpret the past differently. The Christians interpret it in terms of a lost state prior to original sin, communists discover a state prior to private ownership of the means of production, and so on. A Christian might either deny that there was a state prior to private ownership of the means of production or maintain that this state is identical with the state prior to original sin or not a relevant possibility to choose.

If he means that Dasein acquires its utopian ideal by choosing one of the possibilities offered by the past, my claim that, according to Guignon, Dasein selects the possibility relevant to it in light of its utopian ideal see above, chapter 1, section B , would be wrong. Thus, authentic Dasein needs some criterion to choose its possibility from the pool offered by the past. According to this passage, Dasein's choice of its possibility seems to presuppose a commitment toward the future that is independent of the past and its offerings, even if Dasein becomes aware of this commitment only in the moment when it is confronted with the several possibilities offered by the past; a moment that in turn is made possible by Dasein's commitment to the future.

Especially since Guignon uses Wolin's interpretation as the backdrop of his own interpretation HC , he is certainly aware of the charge of circularity in Heidegger's reasoning with regard to this point see below, chapter 5, section C. In the light of this, I assume that he means that Dasein's utopian ideal enables it to make its choice from the pool offered by the past. However, even if he assumes that Dasein's utopian ideal is identical with the possibility it chooses, my two main points with regard to Guignon remain valid, namely, that, according to him, Dasein finds a plurality of offers in the past and is in a free distance to all of them see above, chapter 1, section B.

Benjamin, Illuminations , See Scheler's metaphor, chapter 3, n. Even if all parties used Guignon's schema in the same way, Heidegger's concept would be rightist, since liberals and leftists simply don't interpret history in terms of Gemeinschaft and Schicksal but in terms of reason, class, and class-struggle. One might easily replace this example with, say, the vocabulary of a communist choice.

Thus, the logic of choice itself remains free of any specific political implications. Rather, the development within section 74 suggests the opposite. Thus, if Heidegger had wanted to make this distinction between a general structure and the examples for it, he would have been an extremely poor writer. Furthermore, leftists and rightists negate society in different ways, for the leftists intend an Aufhebung of society whereas the rightists cancel society.

First and foremost, however, liberals and leftists just simply opposed any return of a past. There were some liberals or leftists of whom one might say that they used Guignon' s schema. He hoped that the future development of society would reintegrate to some extent the Gemeinschaften that had been pushed aside by liberal society. However, this is not the revitalization of Gemeinschaft by way of a cancellation of society but rather a dialectical sublation of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in which the main end is the establishment of a rational society.

However, in regard to the basic distinctions they were opposed to the Right. Rightist authors say that people must stop the march of mankind to Israel and go back to, or rerealize, Egypt. Romantic rightists say that people should leave behind in the desert society and all its luggage. Revolutionary rightists say that Egypt will really flourish only if it can take advantage of achievements, such as private property and modern technology, that happened to emerge in the desert. Liberals, social democrats, and communists say that mankind has to go to Israel. For liberals, social democrats, and communists the emphasis is on the fact that in Israel the individuals can behave rationally and without the constraints of the Gemeinschaften in Egypt.

For liberals, Israel is a fully developed liberal society. For social democrats and communists, it is a socialist society. Social democrats and communists disagree, however, as to what the last steps toward Israel will be like. For social democrats, they will be smooth or at least they consider the chances for this good. For communists, however, those steps entail violence. For what is at stake is not the rerealization of a Gemeinschaft, but rather the Aufhebung of capitalist Gesellschaft into a socialist Gesellschaft. The notion of form was introduced by Aristotle in his theory of principles and of the becoming of natural and technical beings Physics I Each being consists of matter and a form, and it comes into existence from them.

A house consists of wood, bricks, etc. Clay is the matter of a statue, and the peculiar shape that makes it a statue of, say, Socrates, is its form. The matter of an animal, according to Aristotle, is most often female menstruation and, later on in its development and existence, its bones, flesh, etc. Aristotle distinguishes between the coming into existence of a substance itself an individual human being, cat, dog, etc. In other words, a human being comes into existence out of female menstruation and the male seed [the form], and not out of, say, a pig and the male seed.

In accidental changes, however, it often happens that an arriving form replaces its opposite form in the respective substance Physics V: 1f. The latter also holds true for the elements. Each element consists of prime matter and a form. When air comes into existence, it does not come into existence exclusively out of prime matter and the form air.

Rather, it comes into existence out of water; that is, out of prime matter informed by the form water; the form water is replaced in prime matter with the form air On Generation and Corruption. Recently the notion that Aristotle assumes the existence of prime matter has been challenged see, for instance, Charlton's appendix in his translation of Aristotle's Physics, Books I and II , trans. Charlton [Oxford: Clarendon, ], ff. At the bottom are prime matter and the four elements or only the latter , followed by entities like stones, etc.

Thus, only prime matter is in itself devoid of any forms, while all other matters have certain forms though not the ones they acquire in the respective becomings. No form transforms itself into its opposite.

Martin Heidegger - Was heißt Denken? (Vortrag aus dem Jahr 1952)

The form water does not transform itself into the form air. That is, a matter has to be deformed to a higher or lesser degree in order for a new form to arrive in it and determine it see Metaphysics VIII One might say that, except for the hypothesis of the existence of ideas, Aristotle simply worked out in detail Plato's outline of a theory of becoming in Phaedo.

At least according to the traditional interpretation of Plato, which goes back to Aristotle Metaphysics I:9 , if not to Plato himself, and which is shared by Heidegger IM ff. The very same words also name Forms. This becomes strikingly clear on those rare occasions on which Plato explicitly juxtaposes the Form with the cognate character to bring out the fact that, though closely connected, they are ontologically distinct.

He does so twice in our passage, contrasting "Greatness itself" with "greatness in us" D , and again ''the Opposite itself.

  • Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit.
  • Chapter 8: What Is Existentialism??
  • Academic Philosophy.

Beings of the second kind—and space in Timaeus 48 elf. An idea does not admit, and does not change into, its opposite. Rather, if it can no longer resist its approaching opposite, it will leave those in whom, or in which, it is instead of transforming itself into its opposite Phaedo a 10ff.

In late medieval philosophy, Aristotle's conceptual framework was taken over by Christian philosophers. The eucharistic host involved several ontological problems. The official doctrine of the Catholic Church adopted a mythological notion of change. The accidents of the bread its size, its taste, etc. However, there were heretics who, in the name of the metaphysics of substance and form, replaced the miracle of transubstantiation with a different miracle. God annihilates the bread and wine, or he deforms their matters, cleansing them of forms down to the level of prime matter or the four elements see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae [Rome: Editiones Paulinae, ], ff.

Wadding [Lyon, ; reprint Hildesheim: Olms, ], ff. IV Sententiarum , dist. The accidents of bread and wine remain through God's providence since it is terrible for human beings to eat and drink the flesh and the blood of a human being, since the pagans might mock people who quite openly eat the flesh of their lord, and since the sacrament in that form is more conducive to faith see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae , [article 5]. A house and a bridge both made out of wood differ not qua being made out of wood but insofar as the wooden pieces of the house have an arrangement, a form, that differs from the one of the wooden pieces of the bridge.

A clay statue of Socrates is refashioned into a statue of Plato. The latter differs from the former not qua consisting of clay but through the different arrangement, form, of the parts of the clay. Socrates being educated differs from the uneducated Socrates not qua being Socrates but through the form educatedness being present in the former and absent in the latter.

In this sense, one might define a form as something that makes a difference in regard to something else. The form does so by organizing matter in a certain way. In this sense, a form is the cause of a certain structure or order imposed onto something. In cases such as the statue the form is indeed nothing but the spatial arrangement of the parts of the clay itself. In this sense, the notion of form can be used in regard to beings that are not individuals in the sense in which Socrates, Plato, this dog over there, etc. A democratic constitution establishes structures, relationships between individuals, and habits of individuals that differ from those imposed by an aristocratic constitution.

Miller, Jr. He does not, however, ever say so explicitly. He might have hesitated because in his ontology the form always exists as part of an individual. Norman K. Smith [New York: St. Martin's Press, ], 75 [B 47] , since it imposes the order of succession and simultaneity onto the objects of intuition. Each product of human labor has a possible use value and a value. This formulation indicates the similarities and differences between the use of the notion of form in Marx on one side and Aristotle and Plato on the other.

In Aristotle and Plato, a form or an idea is a definite being that is different from other beings, and it is the cause of certain phenomena. In becoming, a form presences and manifests itself in the realm of phenomena. For Heidegger, this is the beginning of metaphysics. In the pre-Socratics, forms and shapes were the effects of physis as coming forth or emerging as a process without a definite actor or form.

In metaphysics, however, coming forth is thought of as a means through which a preexisting form manifests or realizes itself. And that is what happened. However, what manifests itself is not a definite form but abstract human labor as the value of products. Abstract human labor is a sheer activity that can be quantified and is constantly quantified in the exchange of commodities. It is a suprasensible thing insofar as, in exchanges, it counts as a manifestation of a quantity of abstract human labor, and this quantity of abstract human labor exists as another sensible thing that is socially accepted as the universally valid manifestation of abstract human labor and as the general equivalent of all other commodities.

Note that a capitalist economy is not simply a commodity producing society but one in which a large number of individuals don't own means of production and thus have to sell their labor power as commodity to the owners of the means of production, the labor power thus being the only source of surplus value.

As Kant in his definition of the notion of form, in what follows above I will also use the notion of determination. Plato, Sophist , e 3. For what follows above see the preceding note. As was mentioned above, for both Hitler and Scheler a liberal society is just a step on the way toward socialism and communism; an assumption that was probably shared by many rightists. From this point of view, one can indeed not rely on any inner tendencies of development in society—be they dialectical or not—for one assumes that there are such inner tendencies but that they carry society precisely into the direction that one wants to avoid.

This is the political aspect of the background of Heidegger's theory of conscience and. The quote is from a letter of To develop a notion of the totality of society and history and to relate one's experience to that totality is the capacity of the proletariat and is what dialectics is about HI 1ff. Since I am concerned only with Heidegger's concept of historicality, I cannot go into this issue.

For the same reason, I cannot discuss the problem of theory and praxis in regard to my bright picture of dialectics near the beginning of this section. The proletarians have not produced their power to be the fate of society. Rather, it was given to them by the economic development of capitalism or by history. History has given them the task to decide the fate of society in the way history intends it to be decided.

The proletarians don't act for the sake of themselves. Rather, they realize a mission, given to them by someone else, for someone else, namely, society as a whole. In Heideggerian terms, it is not something which has-been-there; it approaches us from out of the future without having followed us out of the past. Rightist revolutions of that time, on the other hand, don't take place for the sake of the Selbstaufhebung of the victorious party, and they rerealize a past with all its hierarchies and ranks, which have been leveled by the modem age.

A socialist revolution is supposed to do away with all these differences. Thus, in contrast to the leftist revolution the rightist revolution is not the self-annihilation of the winners, but rather their, so to speak, self-reproduction by the annihilation of the other. Prior to capitalism this was not yet a reality. Though in capitalism natural limits no longer exist for the self-determination of humans, the essence is not yet realized because of reification. It begins to be realized in the moment when the proletarians distance themselves from the commodity form, for in that moment all existing determinations, including the commodity form, have become, as Hegel used to say, fluid.

He continues:. They can arise and exist only when the development of the productive power of labour has not yet risen beyond a low stage, and when, therefore, the social relations within the sphere of material life, between man and man, and between man and Nature, are correspondingly narrow. This narrowness is reflected in the ancient worship of Nature, and in the other elements of the popular religions. The religious reflex of the real world can, in any case, only then finally vanish, when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his fellowmen and nature.

He distinguishes between two forms, a conservative and a revolutionary form. See what follows. Their agreement on the crucial differences between Left and Right and on the characteristics of the Right just shows that each of them had sufficient analytical skills in these matters. F of the groups that, according to rightists and leftists, had to expel the other. Was it this that drove me and carried me?

Deconstructionists might not be surprised that Schmitt was not the Aufhalter but the Beschleuniger of National Socialism. Both lived within the house of the Weimar Republic, both erwiderten the call of destiny BT ; SZ , and both went to the door, and opened it for National Socialism. On 3 October , Schmitt delivered the inaugural address of a conference on Jewry and the science of law "Das Judentum in der Rechtswissenschaft". Close to the beginning, he quoted a sentence from Hitler's Mein Kampf that—in the context of the concept of history of the revolutionary Right—presents the structure of Heidegger's sentence on Erwiderung and Widerruf BT ; SZ in the shortest form possible.

See, for instance, SD 66ff. On Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft see SD 75ff. Bass Chicago: University of Chicago Press, , See, for instance, Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger , 61f. Quoted according to H. The passage reads in German:. Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie , Heidegger uses the phrase in the latter sense.

All what is our own, the traditional university and—in general—Gesellschaft, are surrogates. On a ground one has a safe stand see chapter 3, n. Thus, one no longer hangs on something that will fall apart anyway. Even linguistically, the entire passage testifies to what Paul Tillich named. The creation of a national tradition must, in the context of life in the metropolis and its influence throughout the country, pass over all special traditions, the very traditions so important to the myth of origin. Nothing is more untraditional, in the national sense, than this struggle for a national tradition.

What really has been handed down in Germany, and what has remained unbroken down to the present time, is the struggle of the various religious, political, and regional traditions with one another. A struggle of traditions, however, so long as it still has real- ity and has not been reduced to literature, can only be handed down by the protagonists, i. SD 34; SE 39; these sentences conclude the passage on tradition I quoted above, pp. In January Heidegger gave up his efforts to go to Berlin and announced in the speech, "Why do We choose to stay in the Province?

The leaves of a flower entfalten sich, open, and they can do so only because they already exist prior to the moment in which they open. An entire plant or animal entfaltet sich, emerges and grows, only because this Entfaltung is the Entfaltung of the potential contained in the seed or the embryo. The beginning of the document repeats in simple repetition exactly the sentences with erwidert and Widerruf in section 74 of Being and Time. This requires that authentic Dasein expels the individuals who are, so to speak, the incarnations of Gesellschaft.

Beginning to move upward authentic Dasein must take measures not to fall down again. Due to Heidegger's tendency to use as the grammatical subject of a sentence not a particular Dasein but rather an abstract quality or essence of something BT 15 , things get even worse. In that case, the Geschlecht can no longer be hard. This sentence, however, would then have lacked the staccato rhythm it has in its current form and thus would be rhetorically weaker. For since the sentence in its current form invites all the associations I spelled out, the entire passage becomes just ridiculous, and laughter is the enemy of the sublime and the tyrants.

In dealing with these past realizations of potentialities, the historian finds, he does not create, his material. In this sense there is objectivity in the study of history. However, Heidegger rejects the ideal of historical objectivity in a second sense as well. The recovery of past Daseins must inevitably be exceedingly selective.

He must find realization of potentialities in the past that challenge us today to realization of our potentialities. Hence, responsible historical work is guided by a projection of the future. At the same time the projection can be responsible only if it, in its turn, is formed by an awareness of the past. The past is recovered in terms of a projection into the future based on a prior recovery of the past.

This is the circle within which the historian must proceed. The understanding of time in terms of what is presented is a manifestation of the unauthentic orientation of ourselves to the entities in the world. This tendency to orient ourselves in terms of the presented world is accentuated by the fact that the final and decisive possibility of Dasein is death.

To live authentically is to live in terms of my own proper project, and this is ultimately to live toward death. Heidegger Sein und Zeit , Subsection But the realization of this possibility of nonbeing causes me anguish and drives me to lose myself in the things of the world. That authentic life is ontologically possible is clear, but it appears ontically or factually as a rather remote possibility. To show the ontic as well as ontological possibility of authentic existence Heidegger turns to analysis of the conditions of its attainment. These conditions he finds in the phenomena of conscience, guilt, and resolve.

Conscience is the call of Dasein to itself in terms of its authentic possibilities. This call reveals the guilt of Dasein, that is, its not being what in its innermost possibilities it already is. The responsible acceptance of this guilt and the aim toward realization of authentic possibilities is resolve. Subsections 56, 58, However, it points in many respects away from existentialism and has only recently begun to exercise significant influence on theology.

Heidegger turned away from the analysis of Dasein not because he repudiated what he had done but because he found that the question of the meaning of being must be asked more directly. Being must be understood as the being of whatever is and not as equivalent to human being. Ott insists that the virtual identification of being with existence in Sein und Zeit was the fundamental weakness of the early Heidegger.

In this connection he pointed out that being can become a problem for man and thereby be rescued from forgetfulness only when man encounters nothingness as the possibility of every entity. Heidegger immersed himself in the study of the Greeks, for whom being had thus become a problem and who provided the context for all Western thinking about being. But Heidegger found that all metaphysical inquiry has identified the question of the being of entities with the question as to what constitutes them as entities. Martin Heidegger, What Is Philosophy? With this it pairs the question of the ground of all contingent entities in a supreme and necessary entity.

This means to Heidegger that the authentic question of being as such has been lost to Western philosophy and hence to the whole of Western civilization. Heidegger sets himself the task of reopening the question of being through a more original questioning, thereby surpassing metaphysics. When Heidegger speaks of more original questioning, we should understand him in terms of the phenomenological enterprise. The more original question is the one that sheds more of the incrustations of inherited interpretation.

It is the one that succeeds in seeing its intentional object more perfectly as it is in its sheer givenness. We ask about the sunrise more originally, for example, when we free our vision of it from all that we have learned about the motions of the earth and the sun, about clouds and atmospheric conditions, even about colors and their aesthetic significance.

To achieve this more original view of the sunrise is not the simply intellectual operation of consciously removing from our description those elements which are brought to it from our training. It is really to achieve a freeing of the experience itself from these interpretive intrusions. In order to ask the question of the entities as such, all great metaphysicians have had to ask the question with great originality. They have had to overcome the common-sense view of the sheer self-evidence of the entities. Heidegger elaborates the necessity of experiencing in anxiety the possibility of the utter nullity of things to show how it becomes possible to ask the more original question.

Only this experience makes possible real wonder at the sheer fact of the being of the entities. In "What is Metaphysics? From a latter point of view it may be seen as the way in which metaphysics is surpassed. Along with the poets who have unsystematically but profoundly achieved the more original visions of the world, the philosophers have formed the vision that constitutes the ground of all Western existence.

But Heidegger calls us to the still more original question. Entities are structures of being. All new understandings of the entities are in fact new visions of being itself. But they have not penetrated to the unmediated vision of being. Now, at the end of Western civilization and its metaphysics, we must penetrate to this original awareness of being as being in order to gain a fresh starting point. There is no way in which Heidegger can directly tell us what being is.

He can only try with utmost patience to awaken in us the awareness of being in such a way that we can share with him in its progressive understanding. We can talk about its relationships, however, and can say something negatively, if not positively, about it. In the first place, it is clear that being itself precedes and is unaffected by the subject-object dichotomy.

Heidegger never intended that we should understand Dasein as the subject of experience and the other entities as the objects. Yet it is only in his later writings that the radical meaning of Dasein as being-in-the-world becomes clear. Perhaps we should say from the perspective of the later works that Dasein is simply Da-sein, the "there" of being.

And the being which is there is no more the being of the particular person involved than it is the being of all the things which appear in the D-asein. Indeed, in some of the later writings the language of Dasein and other entities disappears, presumably because it suggests too much the self-evident being of particular discriminable entities. We have instead only the actualization of being in the appearing of things, for whose appearing the human ingredient is only one indispensable element.

This whole appearing of being is now the Da-sein of being, the being-there of being. See Ott, op. In the second place, this makes evident the radical priority of being with respect to all entities, including Dasein, in so far as these terms continue to be usable at all. If we are to understand Dasein now, we must do so from the perspective of being.

The reverse order, which characterized the early work of Heidegger, is radically abandoned. Man is removed from the center of the scene. In the third place, being emerges as itself geschichtlich Ibid. Our natural interpretation of this term would cause us to say that being is historical, and this need not be false. However, we must be very careful in using this English word.

If we call being a historical phenomenon, we seem to make it a function of a human history, but Heidegger means just the reverse. Human history is a function of the way in which being appears. Being is geschichtlich, then, not because of its dependence on the human, but because in its appearing it is endlessly becoming something new. Being is not a static reality behind the flow of phenomena.

It is the process of appearing in which it appears and is itself. This historicity of being, which is at the same time the foundation of human history and historicity, determines the fatefulness of human existence. Here Heidegger shows that the way in which original questioning is carried on and answered in any age is not simply a function of the skill of persons in practicing the phenomenological method.

Being presents itself to men, or realizes itself in men, in terms of certain structures. These structures change, but they are not changed by voluntary decisions on the part of men. We do not willfully determine the fundamental vision of being in terms of which we do all our living and thinking.

This is given for us and has consequences for us. We can choose only to be open to being as it gives itself to us or to conceal from ourselves the being by which we are. If we do the former, we think and live authentically. If we do the latter, we think and live unauthentically. The fact that it is now possible for Heidegger and, following him, for us as well -- to ask the question of being more original is itself a fateful situation. Our freedom and responsibility is to share in this openness to being as it now appears to those who have the authenticity to let it be as it is.

In concluding this discussion of Sartre and Heidegger, their respective attitudes with respect to God may be noted. Sartre is an avowed and emphatic atheist. He explains the origin of the idea of God in terms of the absurd project to unite being and freedom, and he shows that the idea of God is precisely the idea of such a union. Furthermore, he understands belief in God as largely antithetical to the full realization of freedom. Atheism is not only demanded by honest inquiry; it is also a liberating doctrine. Heidegger, by contrast, denies that he is an atheist.

This means not that he is a theist, but only that the question of God is not within the purview of his thought. Metaphysics points to God as the supreme being, but in doing so it conceals the question of being as such. Hence, just in this respect metaphysics must be surpassed. Furthermore, Heidegger emphatically insists that being is not God.

If God is, he is an entity, not being as such. Heidegger claims that his vision is more open to God, religiously speaking, than is the doctrine of God as necessary ground. Whether such an entity exists is an ontic, not an ontological, question. But we must recognize that in our own day his existence is not effective for human life. None of them takes the affirmation of God as an ontic affirmation in distinction from an ontological one.

However, this possibility is not to be ruled out. Ott, op. There are several other major thinkers whose thought should be included in any historical account of modern existentialism. But no pretense of completeness can or should be made in this introductory chapter, and for the present purposes the few men treated are generally sufficient. However, in contemporary Protestantism one other philosopher has exercised a profound influence that, though often correlated with that of the existentialist thinkers treated above, remains quite distinctive.

I refer to the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, who has given to the expression "I-Thou" the status of a major category in modern theology. Martin Buber, I and Thou , pp. Buber stresses that man may have an I-Thou relation with a tree or a poem and may have an I-It relation with a human being. Friedman , Martin Buber: the Life of Dialogue , pp.

The I-Thou relation is any relation in which one is genuinely open to the concrete other as it is -- open to letting it present itself on its own terms rather than categorizing it for purposes of utility or personal security. Friedman, op. The I-It relation is any relation in which one imposes upon the other his own ends and meanings and in this sense reduces it to a mere object. Whenever one man exploits another he relates himself to that other as an It. On the other hand, the I-Thou relation can be fulfilled in relations with a person in a way in which it can never be fulfilled in relations with things.

One may regard anything as a Thou, but only a person can in turn regard oneself as such. Full mutuality, therefore, appears only in the relation between persons. Even here it is an ideal limit. Although in one sense only the I-It relation objectifies that to which it is related, there is another sense of objectifying which Buber perceives as prerequisite to both the I-Thou and the I-It relations. This Buber calls the primal setting at a distance and regards as that peculiar human achievement which makes possible relationship of any sort.

Note, however, that in his earlier work Buber tends to identify the I-Thou relation with a lack of distance. Only because man can recognize the otherness of what is not himself can he perceive it as what it is in itself and relate himself to it. This distancing of the other can pass over into its objectification in the sense of the I-It relation. But this is not the spontaneous consequence of distancing. Distancing first of all allows the other to be itself in the I-Thou relation. This is primary also for the child. But as the I develops in the I-Thou relation it is brought into relationship, through the Thou, with a conceptually structured world of things.

Necessarily man relates himself to this public world in the mode of the I-It relation. But the habits of using which develop in this relationship threaten to overcome the habits of openness of the I-Thou relationship. Thereby they become the source of evil in all human existence. We cannot avoid this evil by denial or flight, but we must take it up into a higher unity of good. Buber, I and Thou , pp. The latter is simply the individual. Man is born as such. But the former is the person that each individual has the potentiality to become.

Personhood is a function of relations with persons as persons. Relationship is finally fulfilled only in the encounter with ultimate reality as the eternal Thou. I and Thou, p. But that Thou which is God can never be for us an It. Eclipse of God, pp. Hence, in this age of the dominance of the I-It relation, God is eclipsed. Hence, also, God has nothing to do with the ultimate of philosophic discourse, which is based upon the objectifying thought of the I-It relationship.

It is not even a specifically religious relationship that takes man out of his concrete situation in the world. God is encountered as Thou when the world is encountered as Thou. However, this does not mean that God is only another name for the Thou-quality of the world. It does mean that faith remains in the lived concreteness of life and seeks to realize God through the mutuality of genuine relationship. Buber is fully aware of his divergences from the existentialists treated above. He deeply respects Kierkegaard and acknowledges his debt to him, Friedman, op.

Additional references are given by Friedman, loc. To be related to God as Thou is to be open to the whole world as also Thou. In our own day of the eclipse of God only total openness to our neighbor as Thou will enable us to address again the Eternal Thou. Buber reverses this order, pointing out that genuine life can be achieved only in the mutuality of real community. Both Heidegger alid Buber speak of "making present," Friedman, op. Heidegger sees it as the process of objectifying that which is encountered in the world in terms of projected goals. It is necessary for many purposes, such as science and technology, but its predominance in thought has led to unauthenticity.

This must be countered by recognizing the priority of relationship to the future and past within Dasein itself over this presenting of objects. Buber, on the other hand, sees the making present as the condition of authenticity. To make present is to render the entity free to be itself and to speak for itself. There is another theme in Heidegger, developed in his later thought, in which he speaks of letting things be in opposition to imposing our conceptuality and purposes upon them.

This brings him somewhat closer to Buber, but Heidegger still lacks any element of mutuality between persons. It is the condition for encounter with things as they are, and especially for the relationship of I to Thou, through which alone the I becomes a person. This divergence serves to focus the fundamental difference between Heidegger and Buber. The former seeks the goal and resources for fulfillment with the individual Dasein, whereas the latter insists that man can become himself only in relationship.

They agree that we must not regard the relationship of subject to objectified thing as primary; but Heidegger replaces this with the primacy of the relation of Dasein to its own future, whereas Buber replaces it with another kind of relation to the other -- the I-Thou relation. But his elaborate analysis has led to the conclusion that in the nature of the case the ideal community is radically unattainable.

Buber does not minimize the difficulties involved or deny that failure is frequent. Buber insists that persons become only in relationships, and that we must, therefore, begin with these relationships. The obstacles to full mutuality are ontic and not ontological; hence, they are subject to overcoming by man. Although we may be inclined to identify existentialism as such with the radical individualism of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre, we should recognize that Buber is far from alone in his concern with the encounter or mutual presence of persons.

Both Jaspers and Marcel have developed similar emphases quite independently. Many of those Protestant thinkers most influenced by existentialism have appropriated existentialism with the focus on interpersonal relations to which Buber has given classical expression. Even Bultmann, who in so many ways remains closer to the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit than any other leading theologian, makes use of a concept of encounter that recalls Buber much more than Heidegger. Since a number of the themes treated in the presentation of each of the men discussed above can be found also in others among them, the overlapping among these existentialists is greater than may appear.

Nevertheless, their real differences are also great. If we added discussions of still other existentialists, the diversity would become still more impressive. Rather than thus add to the confusion, we will now turn from the historical account of individual thinkers and conclude this chapter with an attempt to present a "typical" existentialist position which, while not accurately describing the thought of any major thinker, may serve to clarify the kinds of ideas most commonly associated with the term.

We will begin with a nontechnical exposition of the technical philosophic starting point of all existentialism -- namely, the doctrine that existence precedes essence. Most philosophers have observed that what is given to man in his experience is a nexus of qualities structured in certain ways. Out of these qualities are made up all the objects of human knowledge, and the formal sciences of logic and mathematics deal with all the possible structural relations. Qualities and their relations are called forms or ideas by Plato, categories by Hegel.

Now the question is whether existence is itself one of the forms or categories along with the others. Hegel taught that it is. Hence, particular existent things, ourselves included, are exhaustively explainable in terms of the categories. Since the categories are the elements of impersonal thought or universal mind, and therefore subject to rational understanding, everything which is or can be is rational through and through. Another philosophical tradition has held that existence as such is not one characteristic of an entity along with others, but something radically unique and prior to all characterizing.

Thomas Aquinas taught this, and the idea is implicit in most substance philosophies. Indeed, it is almost universal in the common sense of the Western world since this common sense has been informed by Christianity. However, it is ignored by much technical philosophy and scientific thought. Indeed, whenever the analytic approach is paramount, it is endangered. The term "existentialism," however, is meaningful only when it is understood that the existence which precedes essence is first of all human existence.

Materialism also affirms the priority of existence to essence, but its "existences" are nonhuman in character and indeed exclude the possibility of the existence of the distinctively human. Existentialism arose in a context in which this kind of materialism and even less dogmatic forms of naturalism had been excluded from consideration by Kantian idealism. Today it finds as its chief enemy scientism, whether the science which it universalizes regards itself as dealing empirically with existent matter or formally with logico-mathematical symbols.