The Pyro trooper is alerted but he reports that it's just the dogs doing stinky business with the barrels. Since Malver and Virus are incapable of destroying infrastructures, the Proselyte has to resort with the Psi-Corps trooper's capabilities; Mind control. Since they are currently in the northern side of the DMZ, the Proselyte orders the Psi-Corps trooper to make use of Soviet units that are capable of destroying infrastructures but he has to inform him that choosing the wrong unit can jeopardize the whole operation and they will be killed outright. Taking no time for hesitation, he now orders the Psi-Corps Trooper to take control of the Crazy Ivan patrolling nearby to destroy the Airfield.
Unfortunately, there is an active Tesla Coil below the rendezvous zone of Malver and Psi-Corps trooper that is being powered on by Tesla Trooper. Directly moving forward will kill them both so the Psi-Corps trooper takes control of the Tesla Trooper and moves one step away from the Tesla Coil as the coil itself will kill him and break the link, releasing the Tesla Trooper from Mind Control. Now that the Tesla Trooper is out of the picture, he takes control of another Crazy Ivan patrolling nearby but Malver needs to eliminate some EMP Mines before fully proceeding as it will instantly kill the Psi-Corps trooper.
Multiple Sentry Guns are blocking their way, so they have to resort in using Crazy Ivans to destroy them. Moving forward, Malver destorys the barrel on the North Korean Airbase, thus minimizing any hazards. Then, the Psi-Corps trooper takes control of the tank commander of Qilin Tank and orders it to attack the Airfield. It takes a while for the tank to destroy the airfield, but it was worth it.
Now that the Airfield is out, they are already one step ahead into shutting down securities imposed by the North Korean border. This however attracted guards just outside of the airbase and they are ordered to be dispatched to fortify the base. Making their way to the North Korean Field Bureau, Malver accompanies them in the process to quickly eliminate any hostiles that might jeopardize their operations. Breaking in the Field Bureau's security make it hard so Malver has to destroy the Barrel near the watch tower to prevent triggering any security.
After planting multiple bombs on the Field Bureau, the building at last crumbles. Security systems in North Korea have been disabled. The party can now safely engage any units who can call reinforcements without fear of retaliation.
In order to carry out the destruction of South Korean border, Malver then kills the mind-controlled Crazy Ivan so the Psi-Corps trooper can mind control Borillo pilots, offering him a ride to quickly rendezvous with the Virus. As they make their way to the southern border, the patrols from their starting place suddenly intensified to the point Malver is forced to get out of the Borillo for a while and eliminate some armored patrols.
At last, they have reached the South Korean border. Unfortunately, the security is tighter than its Northern opponent as the whole vicinity is crawling with watch towers and worse, Snipers. This made it very difficult for the Virus and Psi-Corps trooper to traverse relentlessly as they have increased chances of being shot dead unnoticed. Not to mention; Rocketeers as well. Keeping the mind-controlled Borilo and Malver all along in the hands of the Proselyte, he orders them to tread more carefully this time. This draws more South Korean guards to oversee what happened and who takes the responsibility of destroying their Airfield like its Northern opponent.
With the Airfield out of the picture and the Borillo destroyed, Malver walks back to sneak in-between the DMZ and orders the Psi-Corps trooper to take control of another Borillo from the North. From there, they sneak in deeper to the other side of the South Korean border to destroy the Robot Ops Control Center. The Borillo, unfortunately, has to become a sacrificial lamb again. This time; Malver stays along with the Psi-Corps trooper.
Moments later, after destorying key buildings in South Korea, it lost its ability to call in reinforcements whenever an intruder was coming from the opposing side passes. Now that the key buildings of both sides are now out of the picture, there is one last structure left standing that will set the whole battleground in fire; an Iron Curtain Device. Afterwards, the tension between the two Korean sides are now coming to their turning point.
A Battle Tortoise arrives and the advisor orders to take control of it. Fortunately, Malver and the Psi-Corps trooper are standing to where the Battle Tortoise is heading so it makes an easy snatch. With the Battle Tortoise in Epsilon hands, they ordered the Battle Tortoise pilot toward where the Iron Curtain Device is and the passengers take care of the hostiles.
Meanwhile, the Proselyte orders Malver, the Psi-Corps trooper, and the Virus to head back to the starting point so that it becomes easy and faster for him to prepare them for the evacuation. The mediators meet at the center of the battlefield exchanging words from each other. This gives the Proselyte enough time to prepare his party to extract them out of the vicinity.
During the height of the tensions between the US and the USSR in the s, two popular films were made dealing with what could go terribly wrong with the policy of keeping nuclear-bomb carrying airplanes at the ready: Dr. Strangelove  and Fail Safe In McNamara's formulation there was the very real danger that a nation with nuclear weapons could attempt to eliminate another nation's retaliatory forces with a surprise, devastating first strike and theoretically "win" a nuclear war relatively unharmed. True second-strike capability could be achieved only when a nation had a guaranteed ability to fully retaliate after a first-strike attack.
The United States had achieved an early form of second-strike capability by fielding continual patrols of strategic nuclear bombers, with a large number of planes always in the air, on their way to or from fail-safe points close to the borders of the Soviet Union. This meant the United States could still retaliate, even after a devastating first-strike attack.
The tactic was expensive and problematic because of the high cost of keeping enough planes in the air at all times and the possibility they would be shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft missiles before reaching their targets.
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In addition, as the idea of a missile gap existing between the US and the Soviet Union developed, there was increasing priority being given to ICBMs over bombers. It was only with the advent of ballistic missile submarines , starting with the George Washington class in , that a genuine survivable nuclear force became possible and a retaliatory second strike capability guaranteed. The deployment of fleets of ballistic missile submarines established a guaranteed second-strike capability because of their stealth and by the number fielded by each Cold War adversary—it was highly unlikely that all of them could be targeted and preemptively destroyed in contrast to, for example, a missile silo with a fixed location that could be targeted during a first strike.
Given their long range, high survivability and ability to carry many medium- and long-range nuclear missiles, submarines were credible and effective means for full-scale retaliation even after a massive first strike. This deterrence strategy and program has continued into the 21st century, with nuclear submarines carrying Trident II ballistic missiles as one leg of the US strategic nuclear deterrent and as the sole deterrent of the United Kingdom. The other elements of the US deterrent are intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs on alert in the continental United States, and nuclear-capable bombers.
Ballistic missile submarines are also operated by the navies of China, France, India and Russia. The US Department of Defense anticipates a continued need for a sea-based strategic nuclear force. The first is a variant of the Virginia -class nuclear attack submarines. The second is a dedicated SSBN, either with a new hull or based on an overhaul of the current Ohio -class. Had such systems been able to effectively defend against a retaliatory second strike , MAD would have been undermined.
See also Strategic Defense Initiative. The multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle MIRV was another weapons system designed specifically to aid with the MAD nuclear deterrence doctrine. Since each defensive missile could be counted on to destroy only one offensive missile, making each offensive missile have, for example, three warheads as with early MIRV systems meant that three times as many defensive missiles were needed for each offensive missile. This made defending against missile attacks more costly and difficult. The multiple warheads made defense untenable with the available technology, leaving the threat of retaliatory attack as the only viable defensive option.
The Soviet Union countered this threat by issuing a statement that any use of nuclear weapons tactical or otherwise against Soviet forces would be grounds for a full-scale Soviet retaliatory strike massive retaliation. Thus it was generally assumed that any combat in Europe would end with apocalyptic conclusions.
MIRVed land-based ICBMs are generally considered suitable for a first strike inherently counterforce or a counterforce second strike , due to:. Unlike a decapitation strike or a countervalue strike , a counterforce strike might result in a potentially more constrained retaliation. If it is assumed that each side has missiles, with five warheads each, and further that each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing two warheads at each silo, then the attacking side can reduce the enemy ICBM force from missiles to about five by firing 40 missiles with warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve.
According to its architect, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown , "countervailing strategy" stressed that the planned response to a Soviet attack was no longer to bomb Soviet population centers and cities primarily, but first to kill the Soviet leadership, then attack military targets, in the hope of a Soviet surrender before total destruction of the Soviet Union and the United States.
This modified version of MAD was seen as a winnable nuclear war, while still maintaining the possibility of assured destruction for at least one party. This policy was further developed by the Reagan administration with the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative SDI, nicknamed "Star Wars" , the goal of which was to develop space-based technology to destroy Soviet missiles before they reached the United States. SDI was criticized by both the Soviets and many of America's allies including Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher because, were it ever operational and effective, it would have undermined the "assured destruction" required for MAD.
If the United States had a guarantee against Soviet nuclear attacks, its critics argued, it would have first-strike capability, which would have been a politically and militarily destabilizing position. Critics further argued that it could trigger a new arms race, this time to develop countermeasures for SDI.
Despite its promise of nuclear safety, SDI was described by many of its critics including Soviet nuclear physicist and later peace activist Andrei Sakharov as being even more dangerous than MAD because of these political implications. Supporters also argued that SDI could trigger a new arms race, forcing the USSR to spend an increasing proportion of GDP on defense—something which has been claimed to have been an indirect cause of the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Proponents of ballistic missile defense BMD argue that MAD is exceptionally dangerous in that it essentially offers a single course of action in the event of nuclear attack: full retaliatory response.
The fact that nuclear proliferation has led to an increase in the number of nations in the " nuclear club ", including nations of questionable stability e. North Korea , and that a nuclear nation might be hijacked by a despot or other person or persons who might use nuclear weapons without a sane regard for the consequences, presents a strong case for proponents of BMD who seek a policy which both protects against attack, but also does not require an escalation into what might become global nuclear war.
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Russia continues to have a strong public distaste for Western BMD initiatives, presumably because proprietary operative BMD systems could exceed their technical and financial resources and therefore degrade their larger military standing and sense of security in a post-MAD environment. Russian refusal to accept invitations to participate in NATO BMD may be indicative of the lack of an alternative to MAD in current Russian war fighting strategy due to dilapidation of conventional forces after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Relations between the United States and Russia were, at least for a time, less tense than they had been with the Soviet Union. Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in June , claiming that the limited national missile defense system which they proposed to build was designed only to prevent nuclear blackmail by a state with limited nuclear capability and was not planned to alter the nuclear posture between Russia and the United States. While relations have improved and an intentional nuclear exchange is more unlikely, the decay in Russian nuclear capability in the post-Cold War era may have had an effect on the continued viability of the MAD doctrine.
Lieber and Press argued that the MAD era is coming to an end and that the United States is on the cusp of global nuclear primacy. However, in a follow-up article in the same publication, others criticized the analysis, including Peter Flory, the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, who began by writing "The essay by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press contains so many errors, on a topic of such gravity, that a Department of Defense response is required to correct the record.
A situation in which the United States might actually be expected to carry out a "successful" attack is perceived as a disadvantage for both countries. The strategic balance between the United States and Russia is becoming less stable, and the objective, technical possibility of a first strike by the United States is increasing. At a time of crisis, this instability could lead to an accidental nuclear war.
For example, if Russia feared a US nuclear attack, Moscow might make rash moves such as putting its forces on alert that would provoke a US preemptive strike. An outline of current US nuclear strategy toward both Russia and other nations was published as the document " Essentials of Post—Cold War Deterrence " in Whether MAD was the officially accepted doctrine of the United States military during the Cold War is largely a matter of interpretation. The United States Air Force , for example, has retrospectively contended that it never advocated MAD as a sole strategy, and that this form of deterrence was seen as one of numerous options in US nuclear policy.
However, according to a declassified Strategic Air Command study, US nuclear weapons plans specifically targeted the populations of Beijing, Moscow, Leningrad, East Berlin, and Warsaw for systematic destruction. To continue to deter in an era of strategic nuclear equivalence, it is necessary to have nuclear as well as conventional forces such that in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a victory or any plausible definition of victory. To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practical, if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack.
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Main article: Second strike. Absolute war Appeasement Balance of terror Counterforce Moral equivalence Nuclear winter Nuclear missile defense Nuclear holocaust Nuclear peace Nuclear strategy Pyrrhic victory Rational choice theory Weapon of mass destruction. Alan J. BBC News. Retrieved Simpson, J. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Garner, Bryan A. Abridged 7th ed. Paul, Minn. The Wilkie Collins Society.
Spring Retrieved 17 September Paris in the twentieth century. Howard, Richard, 1st US ed. New York: Random House.